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Helping or "Leaving the Scene?":
Altruism or Egoism?
Mark H. Stich 
University of Oklahoma 
Abstract
Weiss, Buchanan, Altstatt, and Lombardo (1971) and 
Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, and Stich (1973) found that subjects 
will learn an instrumental response the only apparent rein­
forcement for which was to deliver another person from 
suffering. The reward was labeled "altruistic reinforcement." 
The present paper examined the Weiss et al. situation for a 
possible non-altruistic source of reinforcement. It was 
suggested that the disturbing sight of suffering rather than 
the perception of a fellow human being in need might have 
been the noxious stimulus motivating learning. An experiment 
revealed that both helping the suffering person (£<.001) and 
"leaving the scene" of suffering without helping (g <.05) were 
sufficiently reinforcing to produce learning of an instru­
mental response. Helping was the greater reinforcer (£<.005). 
Conclusions were drawn about the concept of "altruistic 
reinforcement" and the relationship between altruism and the 
behavior called "leaving the scene."
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Helping or "Leaving the Scene?":
Altruism or Egoism?
Mark H. Stich 
University of Oklahoma 
Employing the general approach which Neal Miller (1959) 
has called "extension of liberalized S-R theory" Weiss,
Buchanan, Altstatt, and Lombardo (1971) and Weiss, Boyer, 
Lombardo, and Stich (1973) found that people will learn an 
instrumentally conditioned response the only apparent reinforce­
ment for which was to deliver another human being from suffering. 
These studies indicated that the roots of altruistic behavior 
are so deep that people will not only help others and receive 
no externally administered reward for doing so, but find the 
mere act of helping rewarding. In addition, these experiments 
revealed profound similarities between the reinforcing function 
of helping another person and the action of more traditional 
reinforcers in instrumental escape conditioning: not only
can learning be based on "altruistic reinforcement," but a 
number of standard reinforcement variables showed the same 
pattern of effects with an altruistic reinforcer as they do 
with conventional non-altruistic reinforcers. Analogs of 
delay of reinforcement, magnitude of reinforcement, partial 
reinforcement, and intermittent shock effects were found.
2Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) suggested that finding helping 
behavior intrinsically reinforcing for the helper is com­
patible with a number of existing views of altruistic 
behavior which propose that altruism is mediated by: innate
altruistic drives (Campbell, 1965); vicariously instigated 
learned drives (Aronfreed, 1968, 1970; Berger, 1962); guilt 
aroused by either actively harming another person (e.g., 
Darlington & Macker, 1966; Freedman, 1970) or by passively 
witnessing another's harm by a third party (Rawlings, 1970); 
and motivation to adhere to a norm of social responsibility 
(Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963).
Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) directed their total efforts 
towards demonstrating that helping could indeed be reinforc­
ing for the helper. No special distinction was drawn between 
"helping" and "altruism." The present paper, however, echoes 
valid traditional concerns with the nature of altruism and 
differences between altruism and more egoistically motivated 
helping. While considerable debate over a formal theoretical 
definition of altruism identifying specific motivational 
antecedents continues unabated, social scientists since 
Durkheim (1897) have generally assumed an operational defini­
tion of altruistic behavior (see reviews by Krebs, 1970; 
Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970). Helping behavior is required to 
occur in the absence of externally administered reward or the 
anticipation of such reward for the helper. Despite the flood 
of recent laboratory and field demonstrations of human behavior
3congruent with such a definition of altruism, many theorists 
have maintained that "there must be something in it for the 
actor" (see comments on this position by Rosenhan, 1970).
To take such a position and then programmatically seek 
empirical support is not to stubbornly denounce man in 
Hobbesian fashion; it is rather to strive for desirable inte­
gration in both theory and research.
The purpose of the present paper is to explore the 
possibility of a source of external, non-altruistic reinforce­
ment for the behavior of subjects in the Weiss et al. paradigm. 
In order to implement this purpose it was necessary to compare 
the basic conditions of the Weiss et al. paradigm with a 
crucially different condition in which the external nature of 
the subject's reinforcement was unambiguously clear. Based 
on the results of this comparison conclusions will be drawn 
about the concept of altruistic reinforcement, as well as 
the relationship between altruism and the behavior called 
"leaving the scene" (e.g., I. M. Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 
1969; J. A. Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972).
Possible Source of Non-Altruistic Reinforcement
Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) had subjects observe an 
experimental confederate trying to perform a motor task while 
the confederate "received" electric shock. At the end of 
each conditioning trial, the subject pushed a button to 
"record" his evaluations of the confederate's performance on 
tape (a deception to mask the actual conditioning experiment).
4Each button-pushing response gave the confederate a break 
from "the shock." The speed (1/latency) of the button- 
pushing response for experimental subjects in all experiments 
increased significantly over trials. Subjects in control 
conditions in which the confederate did not get a break from 
shock did not learn the button-pushing response, and con­
sequently were always inferior to experimental groups.
In contradistinction to these experiments, more natur­
alistic situations permit a commonly chosen alternative to 
helping: getting away from the disturbing sights and sounds
of a victim's suffering as quickly as possible. Human beings 
may choose to leave the scene of an emergency (e.g., Latarfe & 
Darley, 1970; I. M. Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969;
J. A. Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972) while animals may show other 
non-helping reactions to distressed victims (e.g., Lavery & 
Foley, 1963; Rice, 1964). While the difference between 
stopping to help someone in need and abandoning him is 
immediately obvious, both actions can have the similar effect 
of removing from the observer's presence the signs of suffer­
ing and of consequently reducing any emotion in the observer 
aroused by the suffering. When experimental subjects in the 
Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) studies made their button-pushing 
responses at the end of each conditioning trial, they 
witnessed both the apparent offset of the shock to the con­
federate and the confederate's heaving a noticeable sigh of 
relief. Leaving the scene of suffering was, therefore, a
5natural consequence of button-pushing for these subjects.
Did leaving the scene of suffering constitute an external 
source of reinforcement for these subjects? It could be 
equally cogently argued that the instrumental response 
learned by subjects was either entirely reinforced by help­
ing a "suffering" person or entirely reinforced by leaving 
the scene of suffering without regard for the welfare of 
the sufferer. If it could be shown that subjects will learn 
an instrumental response reinforced by "leaving the scene" 
without helping the "distressed" confederate (as opposed to 
"leaving the scene" as a consequence of helping), then the 
appropriateness of calling helping the confederate "altruistic 
reinforcement" should be reconsidered.
It should be mentioned that, while the purpose of the 
present experiment was not to study leaving-the-scene behavior 
per se, the procedure, deceptions, and masking task used 
create an ideal situation for the isolated study of leaving- 
the-scene behavior in a "pure state." The kind of emergency 
situation (e.g., those studied by Lataffe & Darley, 1970;
1. M. Piliavin, et al., 1969; J. A. Piliavin & Piliavin,
1972) in which "leaving the scene" typically occurs is one 
in which bystanders who leave the scene do so by choice; in 
choosing to leave they reject the alternative of staying to 
help. The present experiment, on the other hand, removed 
leaving-the-scene behavior from the context of a helping 
situation. Subjects were given no choice between "leaving
6the scene" and helping. The experiment was not represented 
as a helping experiment, and the process by which subjects 
in the appropriate condition "left the scene" appeared to be 
a regular part of a pre-programmed apparatus cycle.
Comparison of Helping and "Leaving the Scene"
Subjects in the present experiment observed and 
evaluated the performance of an experimental confederate who 
was "receiving" electric shock. Subjects pushed a button to 
"record" their evaluations of the confederate at the end of 
each conditioning trial. There were three groups of subjects: 
(1) A Helping group for which a button push "turned off" the 
confederate's shock. (2) A No-Reinforcement Control group 
for which a button push caused no change in the situation; 
the shock "stayed on." (3) A novel condition called the 
Leaving-the-Scene group for which a button push did not "turn 
off" the shock but did cause a masonite shutter to be lowered 
between the subject and the confederate for the duration of 
each inter-trial period; thus, the subject could not see the 
"suffering" confederate and, in effect, "left the scene."
The performances of the helping group and the no­
reinforcement control group were expected to replicate those 
of similarly treated groups in the Weiss et al. studies. The 
helping group's instrumental button-pushing responses should 
significantly increase in speed over conditioning trials, it 
already having been established that some effective reinforcer 
operates in this condition. At the end of conditioning the
7helping group's response speed should be significantly faster 
than that of no-reinforcement controls, whose performance 
should not improve over trials. A prediction of the leaving- 
the-scene group's performance was more difficult. A number 
of hypotheses concerning the reward value of removing from 
view the disturbing signs of another's suffering, without 
helping the sufferer, were possible. A growing literature 
indicating that man does indeed often act altruistically and 
anecdotal evidence from the Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) exper­
iments that subjects seemed very much concerned for the 
confederate's welfare (one subject insisted on driving the 
"shaky" confederate home) pointed to the following supposition: 
that even if it was reinforcing to remove from view the noxious 
signs of suffering it would be more reinforcing to actually 
help the sufferer. Response speeds for the leaving-the-scene 
group were thus predicted to increase over trials to a point 
where they would be intermediate between the speeds of the 
other two groups. The effects on behavior of helping, leaving 
the scene, and no reinforcement were expected to be respective 
analogs of high, medium, and zero magnitude-of-reinforcement 
effects in discrete-trials instrumental escape conditioning 
(e.g.. Bower, Fowler, & Trapold, 1959; McAllister & McAllister, 
1967).
Two specific hypotheses were made: (1) Response speeds
for both helping and leaving-the-scene subjects would signif­
icantly increase over trials, while those for no-reinforcement
8controls would not; (2) Asymptotic response speeds would have 
a specified rank order, i.e., asymptotic speed for the helping 
group would be faster than that of the leaving-the-scene group, 
and the control group would have the slowest speed.
Method
Experimental Paradigm
A procedure analogous to traditional instrumental escape 
conditioning was used. In escape conditioning the subject learns 
to terminate a noxious stimulus by making an instrumental 
response such as running down an alley or pressing a lever.
The subject learns to make this instrumental response, on each 
discrete trial, upon presentation of a cue which serves as a 
conditioned stimulus, and the termination of the noxious stim­
ulation is called negative reinforcement (e.g., D'Amato, 1969; 
Logan, 1970). Whereas the typical noxious stimulus is electric 
shock or continuous loud noise, the noxious stimulus in the 
present experiment was the simulated suffering of another 
human being. The reinforcement given subjects in the two 
experimental groups of this study involved the removal of the 
"suffering" from the subject's presence by one of two differ­
ent procedures (one which involved directly helping the 
"sufferer" and one which clearly did not involve helping the 
other person). The "suffering" was never removed from the 
presence of subjects in the no-reinforcement control group. 
Pushing a button was the instrumental response, and the 
conditioned stimulus was the onset of a signal light. A
9traditional dependent variable employed in discrete-trials 
instrumental conditioning is response speed (1/latency). In 
the present experiment the dependent variable was speed 
(1/latency) measured from the onset of the signal light CS 
to the occurrence of the instrumental button-pushing response. 
Deception, Masking Task, and Confederates
A deception was used to mask the learning task so that 
the conditioning process would not be overridden by the 
subjects' normal use of their higher mental processes (Spence, 
1966). The experiment was represented as a study of perform­
ance of a complex motor task under stress, and of evaluation 
of that performance by a naive, disinterested observer. It 
was indicated that in aviation psychology such knowledge was 
"becoming more and more important these days, as such things 
as flying or directing aircraft get more and more specialized 
and complex."
A confederate of the experimenter sat beneath a bright 
floodlamp inside a wooden booth and ostensibly received con­
tinuous, "painful but harmless" electric shock while trying 
to track a target on a screen. Each subject's job was to 
observe the confederate through an observation window set in 
one of the four walls of the tracking booth and to evaluate 
his performance. The apparatus provided necessary parapher­
nalia for the confederate's tracking task and for the "record­
ing" of the subject's evaluations.
The reinforcement for subjects within one of the two 
experimental groups, the helping group, was the "offset" of
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the shock, to the confederate, signalled by a noticeable relax­
ing of the confederate and by the offset of the floodlamp.
This reinforcement occurred at the end of each trial and was 
referred to as a brief, pre-programmed "between-cycles" rest 
period for the confederate. What was expected to serve as 
reinforcement for the second experimental group, the leaving- 
the-scene group, was the hiding of the "suffering" confederate 
behind a masonite shutter which was lowered over the observa­
tion window set in the confederate's booth during each inter­
trial period. This event was presented as a "between-cycles" 
interval in which subjects were deliberately removed from the 
.^..evaluation situation for a time so that they could then enter 
each new "cycle" (when the shutter was raised and the "dis­
tressed" confederate reappeared) as if it were an entirely 
different situation in which spontaneous judgments of the 
confederate's performance could be made and would hopefully 
be uncontaminated by information about previous "cycles."
This supposed interest in spontaneous evaluations of perform­
ance on each new "cycle" was also expressed to the other two 
groups in order to achieve the necessary experimental symmetry 
(of course, the masonite shutter was never mentioned to the 
other groups since they would never encounter it). The term 
"cycle" was always substituted for "trial" so as not to 
suggest a learning experiment.
Five undergraduates and two graduate students, all 
appearing to be of undergraduate age, served as confederates.
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The role of confederate was explicitly defined, discussed, and 
practiced by the seven students. The role included agonized 
expressions and shaking in reaction to the "receipt" of shock 
and, for the benefit of subjects in the helping group, a 
noticeable relaxation and sigh of relief when the shock "went 
off." In addition to the dramatics presented to convince 
subjects that the confederate was being shocked, a particularly 
effective sign of physical stress, actual facial sweating by 
the confederate produced by the heat of the overhead floodlamp, 
served to enhance the general plausibility of the deception and 
masking task.
In order to prevent fear of electric shock in the sub­
jects developing within an individual session or spreading 
through the Psych-1 subject pool, it was made clear that 
Psych-1 students were never shocked and that the confederates 
were undergraduate volunteers from more advanced classes who 
had to have reached 21 years of age in order to sign a release 
form for the shock phase of the experiment.
The three female confederates served exclusively with 
female subjects and the four male confederates exclusively 
with male subjects. Each confederate served with an equal 
number of subjects in each of the three conditions.
Subjects and Design
Seventy-five volunteers from the Psych-1 subject pool 
were randomly assigned to three groups with the provision that 
they be completely counterbalanced so that: there would be
12
25 subjects per group, subject and confederate would always be 
the same sex, and each of the seven confederates would run the 
same number of subjects in each group. There were 14 females 
and 11 males each in the Helping. Leaving-the-Scene. and No- 
Reinforcement Control groups.
Subjects in all groups observed a confederate perform­
ing a tracking task while the confederate "received" continuous 
electric shock. Each of 12 conditioning trials ended with the 
subject, upon presentation of a signal light CS, pushing a 
button to "record" his evaluations of the confederate's per­
formance on tape. In the helping condition, a button-push 
produced a "termination" of the shock for ten seconds and the 
confederate's heaving a sigh of relief. In the leaving-the- 
scene condition, a button-push did not terminate the shock but 
did cause a masonite shutter within the confederate's booth to 
be lowered over the observation window, thus concealing the 
confederate from the subject during the 10-second inter-trial 
period. For subjects in the no-reinforcement control group a 
button-push simply marked the end of a trial; the confederate 
remained in full view and continued to "suffer."
Apparatus
The room in which the subject and confederate sat shared 
a common wall with the experimenter's control room. On one 
side of this wall the confederate sat on a cushioned seat 
inside a wooden booth, which measured 3 x 3 x 6  feet in its 
external dimensions, and performed his bogus tracking task
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while reacting to "shock” from a "forearm electrode." At the 
same time, the subject sat on a chair beside the booth, at the 
same height as the confederate, and observed the confederate, 
in profile view, through an 18 inch wide by 12 inch high clear 
glass window set in one of the walls of the booth. Meanwhile, 
the experimenter sat in the adjacent control room before a 
master control panel, setting controls appropriate for each 
experimental condition, recording instrumental response 
latency readouts, and communicating with confederate or subject 
in the next room by means of a microphone connected to head­
phones worn by both the confederate and subject during the 
experiment.
Placed in the wall of the confederate's booth facing 
the subject were an "alarm button," the glass observation 
window, six signal lights, three "evaluation dials," and a 
"record button." Upon illumination the signal lights read:
(1) "SHOCK ON," (2) "SHOCK OFF," (3) "EVALUATION 1," (4) 
"EVALUATION 2," (5) "EVALUATION 3," and (6) "REPORT." Lying 
atop the wooden booth were the subject's headphones.
Placed within one of the internal walls of the confed­
erate's booth were a fake radar-like tracking screen, two 
knobs (called "tracking-task controls"), an electric wall 
outlet (into which the confederate's "electrode" was plugged), 
an "alarm button," and the floodlamp. Behind the tracking 
screen were a number of randomly placed Christmas tree lights 
which, when the confederate manipulated his control knobs.
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conspicuously flashed on and off to enhance the credibility 
of the masking task. The floodlamp was about 12 inches above 
and in front of the confederate.
During the experiment the confederate wore an "electrode” 
strapped to his left forearm, and headphones.
Temporarily secured above the observation window, on the 
confederate's side of the wall of the booth which faced the 
subject, was a masonite shutter large enough (19 inch by 14 
inch) to cover the observation window when lowered and positioned 
between the window and the confederate. The shutter was raised 
and lowered, exclusively for subjects in the leaving-the-scene 
condition, by tugging at or releasing a nylon cord which ran 
through a series of pulleys up through the ceiling of the booth, 
through the wall separating the experimental and control rooms, 
down to a hook set in the experimenter's control panel.
An electric digital stop-clock (1/100 second) on the 
experimenter's control panel measured the subject's response 
latency--the time between the onset of the "REPORT" signal 
(the conditioned stimulus) and the subject's pushing his 
"record button" (the instrumental response).
Procedure
Pre-experimental procedure and instructions. When a 
subject arrived either on schedule or late he found "another 
subject" (the confederate) already seated in a waiting room 
outside the experimental room. When a subject came early, the 
confederate exited through a convenient back door to the lab
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and then entered the waiting room through the same front door 
used by the subject. The experimenter soon greeted the two 
and led them into the experimental room. After introducing 
the subject as a Psych-1 student and the confederate as an 
over-21-years-old advanced student, the experimenter explained 
"the purpose of the experiment" and the different jobs the two 
would perform. The role of the masonite shutter was explained 
to subjects in the leaving-the-scene group. Next, in the 
presence of the subject, the confederate completed a bogus 
medical checklist and signed a release form agreeing to be 
shocked. The "electrode" was then placed on the confederate's 
left forearm and the confederate was seated in the tracking 
booth. As the experimenter left for the control room he 
mentioned that the "alarm button" on the wall in front of each 
person was to be pressed only if some serious emergency arose; 
he also had each person put on headphones so that he would be 
able to speak to them from the control room.
Cycle of operation. Each of the 12 trials of the exper­
iment followed a cycle of shock, floodlamp, and the signal 
light "SHOCK ON" either coming on or continuing from the previous 
trial; illumination of three signals ("EVALUATION 1,"
"EVALUATION 2," "EVALUATION 3") for the subject to set his 
three "evaluation dials" to evaluate the confederate's perform­
ance according to three different criteria; illumination of 
the "REPORT" CS signal for the subject to push his "record 
button" to record his evaluations on tape; the instrumental
16
button-pushing response; and the response-contingent event 
appropriate for each condition. In the helping condition, 
each trial-ending button-pushing response caused the flood­
lamp to go out, the signal light "SHOCK OFF" to come on and 
"SHOCK ON" to go off, the experimenter to announce into the 
subject’s headphones "Shock off," and the confederate to 
noticeably relax during the ten seconds between trials. For 
the leaving-the-scene group, a trial ended with the experi­
menter saying "Shock continues" and lowering the masonite 
shutter to hide the confederate for ten seconds, while the 
"SHOCK ON" light remained on. In the no-reinforcement control 
condition, a trial ended with "the shock" continuing, the 
confederate continuing to "perform under stress," and the 
floodlamp and "SHOCK ON" light remaining on.
Post-experimental procedure. At the conclusion of the 
experiment the subject witnessed the confederate assuring the 
experimenter that he had not been adversely affected by the 
stress. The subject was then dismissed while the confederate 
was asked to remain "to complete a questionnaire," so that the 
confederate could avoid any potentially embarrassing post- 
experimental contact with the subject.
Results
Figure 1 shows the mean response speeds (100/latency) 
over six discrete trial blocks of two trials per block. Although 
response speeds on the first trial block are approximately equal.
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the three curves have separated by the second block, indicating 
differential learning of the instrumental response (i.e., dif­
ferentially increasing response speeds).
Insert Figure 1 about here
The prediction that asymptotic response speeds would have 
the specified rank order: helping, leaving-the-scene, no­
reinforcement control, was tested by a Jonckheere test 
(Jonckheere, 1954; Kirk, 1968; Siegel, 1956). The Jonckheere 
is an elegant and ideally suited test for examining both the 
rank orderings of groups and the differences between them in a 
single operation. Results of a Jonckheere test performed on 
the grand means of the last four conditioning trials indicated 
that group response speeds were in the hypothesized rank order 
and that speeds over the last four trials for the three groups 
were significantly different from each other (z = 2.58, £^.005).
The prediction that instrumental response learning would 
occur in the helping and leaving-the-scene groups but not in 
the no-reinforcement control group was borne out. Repeated 
measures analyses of variance over all 12 conditioning trials 
indicated that response speed significantly increased for both 
the helping group (F = 8.31, ^  = 11/264, £ <.001) and the 
leaving-the-scene group (F = 1.81, ^  = 11/264, £<.05) but not 
for the no-reinforcement control group (F = 1.14, ^  = 11/264). 
Figure 1 clearly shows learning in the leaving-the-scene group
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to have been neither as marked nor as continuous as in the 
helping group (i.e., the leaving-the-scene group reached 
asymptote by the second trial block while the helping group 
was still improving on the last block), indicating a signif­
icant yet much weaker reinforcement effect in the leaving-the- 
scene condition.
Referring again to Figure 1, statistical analysis 
revealed that the drop in the curve for the leaving-the-scene 
group beyond the second trial block is not a significant drop 
and that it is, therefore, appropriate to describe the leaving- 
the-scene group's performance as having leveled off after 
having reached asymptote on the second block of trials. Two 
repeated measures analyses of variance revealed that there was 
a significant increase in leaving-the-scene group response 
speed over the first four trials (F = 3.00, ^  = 3/72, £<.05) 
but no significant change in speed for trials four through 12 
(F<1).
Nowhere in the analysis of the results was there a trace 
of a main or interactive effect of sex of confederate or 
subject.
Discussion
The results of the present experiment supported findings 
of Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) that helping a "suffering" person 
is sufficiently rewarding for the helper to produce significant 
increases in the speed of an immediately preceding instrumental 
response. As predicted helping-group speeds significantly
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increased over trials while no-reinforcement-control speeds 
did not. Taken alone these results indicated that altruism 
can be rewarding for the altruist and that the mere act of 
helping, in the absence of external non-altruistic reinforce­
ment, had produced learning in the helping group. The pre­
dicted finding that subjects in the novel leaving-the-scene 
condition also learned the instrumental response, however, 
calls for some reconsideration of the concept of "altruistic 
reinforcement."
Finding leaving the scene of suffering without helping . 
the sufferer sufficient reinforcement to produce increasing 
response speeds in the leaving-the-scene group supported both 
the assumption that a person who actually helps relieve the 
suffering leaves the scene of suffering as a natural conse­
quence of helping, and the contention that leaving the scene 
would, therefore, constitute part of the reinforcement for the 
helping group. If a clearly external source of non-altruistic 
reinforcement (leaving the scene) contributed to the total 
reinforcement for the helping group, were Weiss et al. (1971,
1973) justified in referring to helping as "altruistic rein­
forcement" in their experiments?
Part of the answer to the above question may come from 
a consideration of the obtained difference in reinforcement 
magnitude between helping and leaving the scene. If leaving 
the scene constituted a portion of the reinforcement for the 
helping group, what was the nature of the remaining reinforcement
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which caused helping to act as greater reinforcement than merely 
leaving the scene without helping? Could helping have been more 
reinforcing than leaving the scene simply because it was the 
more effective of two entirely non-altruistic reinforcers? Did 
helping merely enable subjects to more completely leave the 
scene, since leaving the scene of suffering left with subjects 
the knowledge that the suffering continued while actually 
relieving the suffering put it both "out of sight and mind?"
While the possibility that helping was entirely non-altruistic 
reinforcement should not be dismissed without further investi­
gation, both formal data and anecdotal evidence strongly 
indicated the existence of altruism. Figure 1 cogently shows 
the reward value of leaving the scene to have been far inferior 
to that of helping, the magnitude of the difference implying 
that there was much more to helping than just leaving the scene. 
Also, it is interesting that many subjects not only expressed 
concern for the confederate, as in Weiss et al. (1971, 1973), 
but also communicated their feelings of relief for the con­
federate (more than for themselves) when told the experiment 
had ended. Paraphrasing Aronfreed (1968, 1970), the evidence 
indicates that reward for the helping group had been primarily 
derived from subjects' vicarious experience of the consequences 
of helping for the confederate rather than from their direct 
experience of its consequences for themselves. Helping seems 
to have been more the reinforcement itself than a means to attain 
some other reinforcer, and to have been a predominantly
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"altruistic reinforcer" containing only a small non-altruistic 
component.
But can helping be labeled "altruistic" if the prevail­
ing operational definition of altruism does not allow for the 
existence of any external rewards for the helper, no matter 
how small? The answer must be "no." In view of the experiment 
reported here, this logical answer does not seem fully adequate, 
suggesting that this traditional question about the defining 
criteria of altruism is itself inadequate, despite the straight­
forward operational level at which it is posed. The question 
is certainly too significant to be dodged by calling it 
"semantic" or "lexicographical," nor need it be surrendered to 
the domain of philosophers. The present experiment permitted 
the question to be reformulated in a more subtle manner which 
yielded a more precise empirical answer, so that one may speak 
of identifiable altruistic and egoistic components of helping.
It should be noted that there probably are a number of 
helping situations in which "leaving the scene" is not possible 
and therefore not reinforcing. For example, there may be 
instances of what might be termed "positive altruism" in which 
the attainment of some positive goal (e.g., possibly the 
"restoration of equity" which Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 
1970, suggested motivates altruism) rather than the termination 
of a noxious stimulus is the reward.
One rather puzzling result of the present experiment is 
the rapid achievement of asymptotic performance by the
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leaving-the-scene group. In Figure 1 the helping-group curve 
shows some resemblance to the gradually rising learning curve 
typical of instrumental conditioning studies, but the leaving- 
the-scene group curve levels off after only a third of the 
conditioning trials. This rapid rise to asymptote represents 
a point of disanalogy between leaving the scene of suffering 
and traditional reinforcement in instrumental conditioning. 
Although the speed of the leaving-the-scene group did increase 
to a point intermediate between the speeds of the helping and 
no-reinforcement control groups as predicted, the absence of 
a gradual learning curve for that group renders the apparently 
valid analogy between helping, leaving the scene, and no 
reinforcement and high, medium, and zero magnitudes of rein­
forcement in traditional conditioning studies less than perfect.
Apparently some complex process occurring during the 
conditioning of the leaving-the-scene group produced its 
atypical curve. This group's rapid achievement of asymptote 
might be at least partially explained as follows: Escape from
an aversive situation was sufficiently reinforcing to produce 
a significant rise in response speed over the first four trials. 
But, by the end of four trials, the knowledge that the confed­
erate was continuing to suffer behind the lowered masonite 
shutter (possibly accompanied by increasingly vivid representa­
tions within subjects of the unseen suffering) had become 
sufficiently noxious to subjects to offset the effects of rein­
forcement enough to prevent further increments in response speed.
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Beyond the second block of trials leaving the scene was still 
adequate reward, though, to maintain asymptotic performance.
In a real-life emergency it may be easier, and consequently 
more reinforcing, to "blot out" the ongoing suffering of an 
abandoned victim by putting many miles rather than a thin 
piece of masonite between oneself and "the scene."
Finally, an interesting alternative explanation of the 
present experiment's leaving-the-scene condition and of the 
leaving-the-scene group's performance in terms of social facil­
itation theory is worthy of brief mention, Weiss and Miller 
(1971) cited evidence in the social facilitation literature 
that the drive aroused in the performer of some task by the 
presence of an audience is aversive in nature. The authors 
suggested that, in different circumstances, this aversive drive 
might be more specifically labeled fear, shame, embarrassment, 
effectance, or guilt. In addition, the authors proposed that 
if audience-induced drive is aversive it might be studied in 
a number of standard experimental paradigms in which the effects 
of aversive drives are examined. One of these paradigms is 
instrumental escape conditioning. Weiss and Miller suggested 
that a subject might learn to make an instrumental response 
the reinforcement for which is the termination of audience 
observation. While the role of the subject as an observer of 
the confederate in the present experiment has been stressed, 
it may be fruitful to note that the confederate was also an 
audience for the subject's performance of his task. If the
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confederate's reactions to stress aroused fear, shame, guilt, 
or some other aversive drive in subjects, a possible reinforce­
ment for the leaving-the-scene group's instrumental responses 
may have been the termination of audience observation by hiding 
the audience behind a masonite shutter.
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Figure Caption 
1. Curves of instrumental response speed under three 
reinforcement conditions; helping; leaving the scene; and 
no-reinforcement control.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The present study involves an attempt to determine the 
extent to which helping a suffering person within a particular 
experimental situation is altruistically or nonaltruistically 
motivated. The following will consist of: (1) a review of
historically significant nonexperimenta1 thought on the role 
of altruism in human behavior; (2) a review of the recent 
experimental literature on human altruistic behavior; and 
(3) the present experimental proposal.
From Plato to the time of Comte virtually all 
theories of the social nature of man were tied to, 
and incidental to, theories of the state. For this 
reason we may rightly say that up to a century ago 
social psychology was largely a branch of political 
philosophy (Allport, 1968, p. 5).
Throughout history man has found it necessary and, for 
the most part, desirable to live in cooperative groups. The 
prevalence of altruistic behavior amongst the cooperation 
and "mutual aid" characteristic of ordered societies remains 
a moot question.
In analyzing the formation of societies philosophers 
have typically contrasted "civilized" man living under
2governments and laws with their conceptions of unrestrained 
"primitive" man. Beginning with Plato a number of "rational­
ist" philosophers have contended that men "agree" to group 
together for the general welfare of all, while Aristotle 
preceded a line of "irrationalists" who postulated social 
instincts driving man (see historical reviews by Allport, 
1950, 1968; Coser, 1971; Runkle, 1968; Sabine, 1961; Stuart, 
1933). Plato prefaced the "social contract" theories of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau with the view that man needed 
society for maximum happiness, that group membership provided 
benefits unavailable to solitary man. As would Smith, Comte, 
Darwin, Spencer, Kropotkin, and McDougall, Aristotle con­
tended that societies are formed because of man's innate 
affiliative or gregarious motives; man was born to be a 
"social animal."
As had Machiavelli a century before him, Hobbes (in 
1651) denounced man as a totally pleasure-seeking, self- 
centered entity (e.g., see Runkle, 1968; Sabine, 1961). To 
Hobbes, man free in nature seeks only personal power, and 
all men are, therefore, each other's enemies. The essence 
of human nature is expressed by "mutual harm." Positive 
forms of social behavior are allowed to occur only after 
government and order are forced upon man by an absolute 
sovereignty, the "Leviathan." But Hobbes believed man's 
basic egoism made sustained cooperation impossible; when 
serving others no longer serves oneself, man will seek other
3means for personal gain. There is no true altruism, only 
"enlightened self-interest."
Locke (in the late 17th century) and Rousseau (in the 
18th century) agreed with Hobbes that societies are formed by 
"social contract" between people, but assumed entirely differ­
ent social motivations for such action (see Runkle, 1968; 
Sabine, 1961). Locke believed that by "natural law" man had 
the right to life, liberty, and property. Government's pur­
pose was to create optimum conditions under which all men 
could pursue freedom and happiness while exercising a God- 
given moral obligation not to impede others' ability to do 
the same; government did not need to keep men from destroying 
each other since men were not naturally aggressive. Rousseau 
argued that the drive for self-preservation, which Hobbes 
believed was dominant in man, was tempered by the virtuous 
nature of primitive man as well as by his natural compassion 
for the suffering of others. For both Locke and Rousseau 
government should retain power only as long as it earned the 
"public trust" by protecting man's "natural rights" (Locke) 
and following the "general will" (Rousseau).
The "Utilitarian Ethics" of Bentham (at the end of the 
18th century) agreed with Hobbes' contentions that man was 
entirely devoted to attainment of pleasure and that altruistic 
acts were actually egoistically motivated (see Allport, 1968; 
Runkle, 1968). For Bentham the sole determination of right 
and wrong was made on the basis of whatever permitted "the
4greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham did not, 
however, share Hobbes' view of man as a power-hungry, destruc­
tive brute, Man was considered a logical, rational being who 
weighs alternative actions by a kind of "hedonistic calculus" 
in order to maximize his pleasure and minimize his pain. 
Bentham also opposed the establishment of government by a 
formal social contract. A laissez-faire government and eco­
nomic system involving as little intervention as possible into 
people's private pursuits of pleasure was preferred.
Innate sympathy^
Adam Smith (1759, 1776) and Herbert Spencer (1855), as 
well as Bentham's own student, J.S. Mill, in 1863 (e.g., see 
Runkle, 1968), favored hedonistic theories of human behavior 
and supported laissez-faire government policies but felt com­
pelled to "soften their line" and speak of man's innate 
capacity for sympathy and of man as a social animal. Altruism 
was not merely "enlightened self-interest."
Smith (1759) believed that there is something in man's 
nature which fosters an "unselfish interest" in others. 
Instinctive sympathetic reactions to the emotions of others 
accounted for pro-social behavior. Smith was the first of 
many to propose two basic kinds of sympathy; the quick,
^Both "sympathy" and "empathy" have been frequently 
proposed, and often used interchangeably, as mediating 
processes to explain altruistic behavior; for a clarification 
of their meanings and historical review of the concepts see 
Wispe', 1967.
5reflexive mimicry of someone else's emotional expression and 
the conscious, reflective compassion which follows "changing 
places in fancy with the sufferer" (/175^, 1948, p. 74). 
Justice, the pillar of society, was supposedly based on the 
social awareness provided by conscious, reflective sympathy 
with both the aggressor and the aggrieved.
Spencer's (1855) view of sympathy as an explanation of 
man's affiliative tendencies was similar to that of Smith.
As a result of close social contact in past struggles for 
survival, Spencer believed that sympathy for others' emotions 
had been passed on through evolution among humans and many 
animal species. Both "egoistic and altruistic sentiments" 
are important to a viable society. Spencer felt, however, 
that egoistic activities were clearly more essential to 
"survival of the fittest." Sympathy and resultant gregarious 
tendencies existed merely because of some "evolutionary muta­
tion" and, if not controlled and confided to family life, 
would lead to coddling and the welfare state.
Ward (1883) shared most of Spencer's ideas. To Ward 
altruism was simply an indirect form of egoism sympathetically 
aroused. When a person sympathizes with someone in pain, he 
subsequently feels real pain himself. Altruistic acts occur 
in order that the sympathizer can escape his own pain as a 
consequence of relieving the pain of the sufferer. But this 
"egoistic basis of altruism" represented "the great moral 
paradox" for Ward (see comments by Wispe^, 1967). Why should
6sympathy exist at all in basically egoistic man?
McDougall (1908, 1923) provided a solution to Ward's 
"moral paradox" by reconceiving the concept of sympathy. 
Sympathy, by itself, was considered an emotionally neutral 
process which has no special relationship to altruism.
According to McDougall, we are born with a whole series of 
instincts which, when excited, elicit a series of corres­
ponding emotions. What was called "primitive passive sympathy" 
referred to "a special perceptual adaptation of each of the 
principal instincts for the reception of the emotional 
expression of that same instinct in others" (Wispé^, 1967, 
p. 444). Thus, pleasure or pain in someone can lead to the 
"sympathetic induction" of the same emotion in an observer.
But observing pain in others "simply inclines us, then, to 
avoid the neighborhood of the distressed" (McDougall (1908), 
1950, p. 78) and to reduce our own pain by the quickest means 
available, including simply averting our gaze from the dis­
tressing sight. Altruism occurs only when sympathy occasions 
the induction of what were called "the tender emotions" which 
overcome our natural aversion to pain and "draws us near to 
the suffering . . .  to alleviate their distress" (McDougall, 
(1908) 1950, p. 78).
In the 1920s theories of large-scale instinctive control 
of human behavior began to lose favor. Theories of instinctive 
sympathy have been discarded in the ever-growing literature 
on the experimental analysis of gregarious behavior, and
7conditioned response principles have generally been adopted 
to explain reflexive sympathy and the sympathetic induction 
of emotions (F.H. Allport, 1924; G.W. Allport, 1968; Humphrey, 
1922).
Science's "flight from tenderness”
Whatever his motivations, most writers would agree that 
man displays both aggressive and affiliative tendencies. Yet, 
until recently, the former have received much more attention.
In 1935 Suttie (cited in Allport, 1950, 1968) spoke of a 
scientific "flight from tenderness." Suttie believed that in 
repudiating theology modern science had overreacted, fearing 
that if it investigated affiliative tendencies it would appear 
sentimental and subjective. Allport (1950) believed that, in 
a world in which love and affiliation are basic, these emotions 
are taken for granted and hostility receives more attention 
because of its sharp contrast with this background of peaceful 
cooperation. Schulweis (1964) contended that there is a 
"bias against man" inherited from denunciations of man by 
Machiavelli and Hobbes and more recently by Freud. Freud's 
"pessimistic account of man's essential nature," viewing love 
and altruism as ego-defensive behaviors and sublimations of 
sexual motives, had colored psychology's view of man. A 
popular moral philosophy states "scratch an altruistic act 
and you will find lurking there a coarse and base motive" 
(Schulweis, 1964, p. 364).
8Despite his considerable impact on sociology and social 
psychology Comte (see Caird, 1893; Coser, 1971), who supposedly 
coined the term "altruism," could not convince social scientists 
of the ultimate triumph of altruism over egoism. Comte had 
wanted science to lead this humanitarian victory through form­
ation of a "positivist" religion within a scientific determin­
istic framework and with the battle cry "Live for Others."
A major source of the "bias against man" in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the popular 
adherence to a one-sided interpretation of Darwin's (1859) 
theory of evolution stressing only the egoistic side of man. 
Spencer (1855) considered altruistic behavior an "evolutionary 
mutation" and in 1901 (see Allee, 1943) interpreted Darwin to 
indicate that egoism was "an ultimate principle of biological 
conduct."
This misreading of Darwin was taken to the extreme in 
1888 by Thomas Huxley's "Struggle for Existence Manifesto" 
(reprinted in Kropotkin, 1955). Huxley proclaimed that 
"natural man" is at war with all in a struggle for existence 
while "ethical man" is merely a product of society's laws which 
force morality on man. While the ten commandments have held 
man's "deep-seated organic impulses" in check, Huxley believed 
a much older and more spontaneously obeyed commandment to be 
"increase and multiply." Historically, as population has 
increased and food supply decreased man has broken loose from 
societal controls and entered a Hobbesian struggle for existence.
9Huxley's essay produced the first of a series of replies 
from a number of authors who generally accepted evolution theory 
but considered survival of the cooperative at least as signif­
icant as "survival of the fittest." In a series of articles 
from 1890 to 1896 Kropotkin (1955) argued that "mutual aid" 
had been the neglected aspect of Darwinism and was "as much a 
law of nature as mutual struggle /p. 307." Kropotkin had 
traveled widely and read extensively expecting to find abundant 
evidence of the struggle for existence among humans and animals. 
While he found much to indicate struggle for survival, the 
struggle seemed to be as frequently against adverse natural 
circumstances as against competitors for food and territory. 
Kropotkin found the history of man filled with instances of 
cooperative efforts from primitive tribal development to the 
formation of labor guilds in medieval society. His study of 
animal life revealed numerous instances of cooperation for 
mutual defense and mutual support: "the ants and termites
have renounced the 'Hobbesian war,' and they are better for it" 
(Kropotkin, 1955, p. 14). The prevalence of "mutual aid" was 
attributed to the development through evolution of a broad 
"instinct of solidarity" guiding behavior according to the 
principle that each individual's happiness is closely dependent 
on the happiness of all.
Kropotkin (1955) considered his ideas mere elaborations 
of conclusions already drawn by Darwin, and an examination of 
Darwin (1871) supports this claim. Darwin (1871) gave many
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Kropotkin-like examples of "mutual aid" as well as of frequent 
individual sacrifice for the "general good of the community" 
and "preservation of the species." He proposed that social 
instincts had developed through natural selection and led to 
the growth of sympathy and "fellow-feeling" among members of 
particular species. Darwin (1871) had found that "those com­
munities which included the greatest number of the most 
sympathetic members, would flourish best and rear the greatest 
number of offspring /p. 797."
A number of intellectual disciples of Kropotkin have 
called attention to the survival value of altruistic and 
cooperative behavior. Allee (1943), Campbell (1965), Holmes 
(1945), and Montagu (1950) have all contended that gregarious 
tendencies are motivated by innate organic drives which have 
historically maintained the community life of various species. 
Holmes (1945) called reproduction "the basic altruistic 
activity from which all others are the lineal descendants 
/p. 11^7," and gave as an extreme example the female thread 
worm who sacrifices her life for the preservation of her 
species. In order for thread worm offspring to be born, they 
are first hatched from eggs inside the mother's body and then 
proceed to eat their way from her insides to the outside world. 
Durkheim (1951) spoke of instances of human "altruistic 
suicide" which occur in a number of societies and are presumably 
important to the preservation of societal customs and social 
structure. Campbell (1965) argued that, since altruistic acts
11
seem as essential to survival as egoistic acts, it may not be 
correct to consider them any more morally motivated.
Recent experimental literature
Researchers of human altruistic behavior have generally 
"skirted the problem associated with the specification of 
altruism by employing operational definitions" (Krebs, 1970, 
p. 259). The most commonly accepted operational definition 
of altruism has been that of helping behavior performed in the 
absence of externally administered rewards or the anticipation 
of such rewards. Despite considerable disagreement concerning 
the nature of underlying motivations for altruistic behavior, 
behavior congruent with the above operational definition of 
altruism has been consistently found in a variety of exper­
imental situations (see reviews by Bryan & London, 1970;
Krebs, 1970; Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970; Midlarsky, 1968).
The present review will not attempt to consider the almost 
unmanageably large experimental literature on altruism in its 
entirety, but will concentrate on a presentation of studies 
representative of research inspired by major recent theore­
tical accounts of altruism.
Most studies of human altruistic behavior have involved 
a staged experimental situation in which a subject is presented 
with the opportunity to help someone (an experimental confed­
erate) in need of help because of some contrived situational 
dependence (e.g., help is needed to win a prize or to turn off 
electric shock ostensibly received by the confederate), or the
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opportunity to help in order to correct some wrong previously 
committed by the subject (e.g., supposedly having administered 
electric shock to a confederate, prevented a confederate from 
winning a prize, or ruined an experiment for the experimenter).
Most theories have suggested that a subject who is con­
fronted with such opportunities to help and then proceeds to 
help is motivated to act in order to conform to an internalized 
norm of behavior or to reduce some feeling of discomfort or 
tension (e.g., guilt, inequity-induced tension, empathy) 
resulting from the perception of the dependent person's pre­
dicament.
Social responsibility norm. In a highly productive 
series of experiments Berkowitz and his associates (Berkowitz & 
Daniels, 1963; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Berkowitz & Connor, 
1966; Berkowitz, Klanderman, & Harris, 1964; Daniels & Berko­
witz, 1963; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966) reliably demonstrated 
that a subject will help a dependent person in the absence of 
external reward, even when the subject believed that neither 
the help recipient nor the experimenter was aware of his actions.
In the prototype of these experiments Berkowitz & Daniels,
(1963) recruited subjects in same-sex pairs. The subjects were 
told that: (1) the purpose of the experiment was to develop a
test of supervisory ability; (2) one of the two subjects would 
be the "supervisor" whose task would be to write instructions 
for the other subject, the "worker," who would be asked to 
construct some paper boxes; and (3) the two would be in separate
13
rooms and the supervisor would communicate with the worker 
through notes. Both subjects were then separately informed 
that each had been chosen as the worker and that the other 
subject would be the supervisor. The "supervisor instructions" 
subsequently received by the workers were actually written by 
the experimenter. Each worker then had a 15-minute practice 
period and a 30-minute work period in which to construct as 
many paper boxes as he wished. The practice period yielded a 
baseline measure of performance. The principal dependent 
variable was a difference score indicating improvement in 
performance (increase in number of boxes constructed) from 
practice period to work period (experimental manipulations 
being introduced after the practice period).
There were six groups of subjects. Subjects were told 
that the supervisor's chances of getting a good rating were 
very much dependent on how many boxes they constructed 
("High-dependency") or that the supervisor's rating would be 
solely determined by the quality of the instructions he wrote 
("Low-dependency"). The supervisor supposedly either received 
two reports on the subject's productivity during the work 
period ("High-awareness") or received no reports ("Low-aware- 
ness"). When all subjects had been run in the experiment, the 
supervisor with the highest rating would either win a $3 prize 
("High-reward") or would simply be informed of his achievement 
("Low-reward").
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In two similar experiments Berkowitz & Daniels (1963) 
found a significant dependency effect, with the high-dependency 
group working significantly harder (constructing more boxes) 
for the supervisor than the low-dependency group. Neither 
main effects for supervisor reward nor for supervisor aware­
ness were found. There was an awareness X dependency inter­
action, with high supervisor awareness producing more work 
than low awareness in the low-dependency condition but not in 
the high-dependency condition. The results were interpreted 
as indicating that, although supervisor awareness (and poten­
tial supervisor approval of subject's performance) made a 
difference when subjects were given little other motivation 
to work hard (i.e., low-dependency subjects weren't working 
to help a supervisor dependent on them for a good rating), 
when the supervisor was highly dependent on the subject's 
performance neither the reward the supervisor might win nor 
the degree of the supervisor's awareness of subject produc­
tivity mattered.
Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) proposed that as a result 
of socialization people learn a norm of social responsibility 
which states that one should help someone who is dependent on 
him, even though there may be no reward for doing so. Subjects 
in the high-dependency condition had conformed to the norm of 
social responsibility by working hard to help the dependent 
supervisor. This supposition was supported by a post-experi­
mental questionnaire on which high-dependency subjects reported
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having experienced greater feelings of obligation to help the 
supervisor than did low-dependency subjects. Further evidence 
of the strength of the dependency variable in eliciting helping 
behavior came from Berkowitz, Klanderman, and Harris (1964) who 
found no effect on subject performance of experimenter awareness 
of how many boxes were constructed, and from Berkowitz and 
Connor (1966) who found that the greater the dependence of the 
supervisor's rating on the subject's productivity, expressed 
in terms of different percentages of dependency, the harder the 
subject worked.
On the basis of a pre-experimental "personality ques­
tionnaire," Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) told subjects they 
would either probably like ("High-liking") or dislike ("Low- 
liking") the supervisor. High-liking subjects constructed 
significantly more boxes than did low-liking subjects for a 
high-dependent supervisor but not for a low-dependent super­
visor. The authors concluded that the social responsibility 
norm to help a dependent person becomes more salient when that 
person is liked, and less salient when he is not liked.
In addition to a situation in which a dependent person 
is not liked, other instances in which it was found that the 
positive relationship between dependency and helping was 
dampened by some factor which presumably lessens the salience 
of the social responsibility norm include: (1) when the
dependence of the needy person is voluntary rather than the 
result of circumstances beyond his control (Schopler &
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Matthews, 1965); (2) when the helper feels pressured to help 
(Brehm & Cole, 1966; Goodstadt, 1971); (3) when helping may 
cost the helper a loss of status (Berkowitz, 1970; Schopler & 
Bateson, 1965) or a large amount of money (Schaps, 1972; Wagner 
& Wheeler, 1969); (4) when subjects had previously witnessed 
an experimental confederate act as a "negative" or "selfish 
model" who denied help to someone in need as opposed to having 
seen a "charitable" or "generous model" help someone (e.g..
Test & Bryan, 19 69; Wagner & Wheeler, 1969); (5) wben subjects 
had done poorly on a prior, irrelevant task (Berkowitz & Connor, 
1966); (6) when the subject himself had been denied help on a 
prior task (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Goranson & Berkowitz, 
1966); and (7) when the subject had received compulsory as 
opposed to voluntary prior help (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966).
Norm of reciprocity. Studies by Berkowitz and Daniels
(1964) and Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) found that a subject's 
receipt of prior help increased the amount of help he sub­
sequently gave, presumably by increasing the salience of the 
social responsibility norm for that particular situation. 
Goranson and Berkowitz (1966), however, also found subjects to 
be more helpful to the same person who had provided the prior 
help than to a different person. They concluded that while 
conformity to the social responsibility norm had caused sub­
jects to help someone who had not given them prior help, 
conformity to a possibly stronger norm of reciprocity 
(Gouldner, 1960) produced greater helping of someone to whom
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the subjects felt indebted. Gouldner (1960) had proposed that 
a stabilizing factor in most societies is the obligation most 
people feel to help those who have previously helped them, 
i.e., to conform to a norm of reciprocity. Goranson and 
Berkowitz (1966) s uggest ed as an alternative to conformity 
to the social responsibility norm, the possibility that sub­
jects help dependent strangers as well as those who had given 
them prior help because of a "generalized norm of reciprocity" 
stating that we should help people similar to those who have 
helped us.
Test and Bryan (1969) found subjects who had received 
prior help to be more helpful than those who had not, yet not 
to be any more helpful than non-helped subjects who had wit­
nessed a third party (a "model") help the dependent person.
The authors concluded that the subjects who had received prior 
help were not conforming to a generalized reciprocity norm 
when they helped the dependent person. It was suggested that 
receiving prior help had established a situational norm of 
helping in the same way that merely witnessing the act of 
helping had; the helpers in both situations had acted as models 
of proper behavior. Hence, the study offered evidence that the 
norm of social responsibility may be made more salient by either 
receiving prior help or witnessing prior help to someone else.
Greenglass (1969) found evidence for a "negative (gen­
eralized) norm of reciprocity" for subjects who had been 
previously harmed (i.e., the more similar the dependent person
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needing help to the person who had harmed the subject, the 
less help the subject gave him), but support for the social 
responsibility norm position for subjects who had received 
prior help (i.e., prior help elicited more help from subjects 
than no prior help regardless of the similarity of the 
dependent person to the prior helper).
Darley and Latade (1970) argued that norms are "rather 
unimportant determinants of behavior in specific helping 
situations, and that they should rarely be invoked unless all 
other alternative explanations fail 85/." They felt that 
norms are so general and so numerous that there probably exists 
a norm to fit every occasion. The remainder of this review 
will concern authors who apparently agreed with Darley and 
Latane and have postulated more specific mechanisms or 
processes to account for altruistic behavior.
Guilt. A number of experiments (e.g., Carlsmith & Gross, 
1969; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 
1967; Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972; Wallace & Sadalla,
1966) have found indications that altruistic behavior is at 
least sometimes motivated by guilt felt by subjects who believe 
they've committed some transgression.
Darlington and Macker (1966) found that significantly 
more experimental subjects who were told they had failed to 
earn experimental credit for their partner by doing poorly on 
three paper-and-pencil tasks volunteered to give blood to a 
local hospital than did controls whose partner hadn't been 
eligible for experimental credit.
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Wallace and Sadalla (1966) found that significantly 
more "caught transgressors" (whose apparent responsibility 
for ruining the experiment by breaking the apparatus became 
known to the experimenter) volunteered to receive electric 
shock in a future experiment than did either "non-caught 
transgressors" (whose transgression didn't become known to 
the experimenter) or non-transgressing control subjects. The 
authors labeled the volunteering for the shock experiment 
"atonement through seIf-punishment" and concluded that "non­
caught transgressors" did not differ from controls because 
"social recognition" of transgression was a necessary pre­
condition for self-punitive behavior. The authors suggested 
that se If-punishment is an attempt by a transgressor to reduce 
or prevent externally administered punishment, which public 
knowledge of a transgression makes more likely (similar to the 
account of self-punishment by Aronfreed, 1968).
Three experiments by Freedman, Wallington, and Bless 
(1967) revealed that subjects induced to lie about receiving 
a pre-experimental "tip off" from a confederate concerning the 
nature of the upcoming experiment and also subjects who knocked 
over a pile of index cards belonging to a graduate student were 
more willing to volunteer for a future experiment than were 
non-transgressors. In the third of these experiments signif­
icantly more subjects who knocked over the graduate student's 
cards volunteered for an experiment run by that graduate student 
than did controls, but only when told that they would not be
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meeting the graduate student. The authors speculated that 
the subjects in this last experiment had preferred to avoid 
contact with the person they had "harmed" presumably, as 
Wallace and Sadalla (1966) suggested, to avoid possible 
retaliation.
Carlsmith and Gross (1969) had subjects either "deliver 
electric shock" to a confederate or to simply sound a buzzer 
whenever the confederate made an "incorrect response" in a 
"concept-formation" learning task. The "injured" confederate 
subsequently asked the subject to help him phone people about 
signing a petition to save some trees from being torn down 
for a freeway. Seventy-five percent of the subjects who had 
"administered shock" but only 25 percent of the controls 
volunteered. In a second experiment, a "third subject"
(another confederate) witnessed the subject's transgression 
and later elicited significantly more volunteers to help him 
phone people to sign the petition than did the "shocked" con­
federate. Thus, again evidence was found indicating that 
"guilty" subjects are more likely than non-guilty subjects to 
comply with requests for help but that they prefer to avoid 
future interaction with someone they have harmed. It would 
also seem that making restitution is often an unpopular means 
of expiating guilt.
Regan, Williams, and Sparling (1972) pointed out that 
previous guilt studies in which a harm-doer complied with a 
direct request for help have confounded compliance and altruism.
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A direct request for compliance can pressure a subject, and 
the authors believed that guilt leads to genuine altruism as 
well as mere compliance. The authors, therefore, reported a 
field experiment which permitted subjects the opportunity for 
voluntary altruism--for "voluntary expiation of guilt." Regan, 
Williams, and Sparling (1972) confirmed their test of this 
"strong guilt hypothesis" by finding that significantly more 
subjects informed a confederate that she had lost some candy 
from a broken grocery bag when they believed they had 
previously broken someone's camera than when they did not.
Reactive guilt and anticipatory guilt. Rawlings (1968) 
proposed that "studies of guilt-produced altruistic behavior 
should include an additional control group that witnesses the 
harm to the victim but is not personally responsible for this 
harm [p. 3777," in order to determine if personal responsibility 
is a necessary antecedent of guilt arousal. Rawlings (1968) 
ran a two-phase experiment involving only female subjects. In 
the first phase, subjects were paired with a partner (a con­
federate) in an "auditory-discrimination task." On each of a 
number of trials the subject was presented with a tonal pattern 
and was asked to estimate how many discrete tones were contained 
within the pattern. The subject made an "incorrect estimate" 
on ten of 16 trials. In the "guilt" condition, the subject's 
partner was "shocked" every time the subject was wrong; sub­
jects were made to feel personally responsible for harm-doing.
In an "observation group," the partner was supposedly shocked
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on a random schedule unrelated to subjects' estimates; sub­
jects witnessed but were not responsible for harm-doing. In 
a "non-shock control group," neither the subject nor her partner 
was shocked, and in a "shock control group" both were shocked 
when the subject was "incorrect."
In the experiment's second phase, all subjects were 
treated alike. They were paired with a different partner 
(who remained unseen and was actually nonexistent) and served 
as "instructors" required to teach the partner a concept by 
giving clue words on a series of trials. On each trial on 
which the partner "failed to learn the concept" both subject 
and partner would be shocked. The duration of the shock given 
the partner was supposedly inversely related to the duration 
of the subject's shock. At the start of each trial the subject 
indirectly determined the duration of the partner's shock by 
setting a dial which determined the duration of her own shock. 
The dependent measure of altruism was how much shock subjects 
gave themselves (and indirectly how little they gave the 
partner) on each trial; the partner did not "learn" the concept 
until the seventeenth trial. Rawlings found no difference in 
amount of altruistic behavior between subjects who had been in 
the "guilt" and "observation" groups, with both groups acting 
significantly more altruistically (sparing the partner more 
shock) than the two control groups.
Rawlings (1970) explained the results of this experi­
ment by postulating the existence of two kinds of guilt.
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Altruism in the "guilt" condition of the above experiment was 
motivated by "Reactive Guilt," which is aroused by the know­
ledge that one has previously committed some transgression; 
this is the kind of guilt typically studied. Altruistic sub­
jects in the "observation" condition, on the other hand, were 
motivated by "Anticipatory Guilt," which is aroused by the 
expectation that failure to act altruistically in a potential 
helping situation will constitute a violation of the norm of 
social responsibility (e.g., Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963). 
Witnessing harm-doing in the first phase of the experiment 
supposedly increased the salience of the social responsibility 
norm for "observation-group" subjects, and made them aware 
that failure to help their partner (by reducing the duration 
of the partner's shock) in the second phase would violate that 
norm.
Regan (1971) found evidence that something other than 
guilt may motivate the altruistic behavior of subjects who 
have previously witnessed but were not responsible for harm- 
doing. Witnesses to the "ruin" of a rat experiment being run 
by the experimenter subsequently gave just as freely to a 
"charitable fund" as did "responsible" subjects who had, 
themselves, "ruined" the experiment. However, when half the 
"responsible-condition" subjects were given the opportunity 
to "cathart and/or rationalize their guilt," during an inter­
view prior to the request for charity, they later behaved less 
charitably than subjects who were not interviewed. On the
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other hand, there was no decrease in altruism on the part of 
interviewed "witness-condition" subjects. Regan (1971) 
reasoned that, while guilt about personal actions was reduced 
in "responsible" subjects, nonresponsible "witness" subjects 
were concerned with the injustice of the situation rather than 
their personal actions. "Witness" subjects were compelled to 
act charitably in order to reconfirm their belief in a "just 
world" (see later section of this review on "perceived 
injustice" as a motive for altruism).
Inequity. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1970) 
presented a formal theoretical alternative to the guilt 
explanations of the actions of a harm-doer. These authors 
applied Homan's (1961) concept of "distributive justice" and 
Adams' (1965) theory of "equity" to helping situations. 
"Distributive justice" and "equity" described people's desire 
for a "just return" on their investments. Adams (1965) proposed 
that a person in a social exchange relationship tends to compare 
his "inputs" (i.e., traits and behaviors for which he believes 
he should be rewarded) with those of someone similar to him 
in order to determine if his "outcomes" (i.e., rewards and 
satisfactions) are "equitable" or "inequitable" in comparison 
with those of the other person. The perception of "inequity" 
creates tension in the perceiver which motivates his restora­
tion of "equity" to the relationship by increasing or 
decreasing (depending on who is the benefactor of the inequity) 
either his inputs and/or outcomes or those of the comparison 
person.
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Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1970, p. 181) defined 
harm-doing as "the commitment of an act which produces an 
inequitable relationship," . . , such that the harm-doer's 
outcome/input ratio becomes greater than that of the "victim." 
Inequity produces distress in the harm-doer which motivates 
his restoration of equity to the relationship by an increase 
in the victim's outcomes (e.g., compensating the victim for 
the harm done) or a decrease in his own inputs (e.g., self­
punishment). The harm-doer can also restore equity by dis­
torting reality and convincing himself that the relationship 
was indeed equitable. He can justify his harm-doing by 
derogating the victim (i.e., lowering the victim's inputs so 
that he appears deserving of his lowered outcomes), denying 
responsibility for the harm, or minimizing the victim's 
suffering.
A specific hypothesis of equity theory concerning the 
justification technique of restoring equity is that the harm- 
doer will tend to prefer highly credible justifications and 
avoid justifications likely to be challenged by objective 
reality. Walster, Berscheid, and Barclay (1967) found that 
subjects were least likely to resort to cognitive distortions 
which would be challenged by objective reality.
Another specific hypothesis stated that the more adequate 
the available compensation, the more likely the harm-doer is 
to compensate the victim. "Adequacy of compensation" is "the 
extent to which the compensation would exactly balance the
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costs the victim has suffered" (Walster, et al., 1970, p. 187). 
In an experiment by Berscheid and Walster (1967) members of 
women's church groups played two "games" with a partner (an 
experimental confederate) for a reward of green stamps. Each 
subject and her partner had to correctly answer a minimum 
number of questions in order to win rewards. The subject was 
led to believe that she had performed poorly enough to "harm" 
her partner by depriving her of the reward. In a "second 
game," the subject either had the same partner as in the 
"first game" (experimental condition) or a different partner 
(control condition). This time the subject was told that she 
and her partner had won rewards. The subject was then given 
the option of awarding some available "bonus green stamps" to 
her partner or to donate it to a crippled child. The bonus 
gave the experimental subjects the chance to compensate the 
partner they had previously harmed, and the unseen crippled 
child was merely an outlet for subjects who did not want to 
compensate their partner yet still wanted to appear generous. 
Berscheid and Walster found that experimental subjects were 
significantly more likely to compensate their partner when 
the available bonus was exactly equal to the number of green 
stamps they had previously cost their partner than when the 
bonus was either greater or less than that amount. These 
differences were not found among control subjects.
Berscheid, Walster, and Barclay (1969) also found 
previous harm-doers more likely to compensate their victims
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with an "adequate" rather than an "excessive" or "insufficient" 
compensation, but only when given five minutes to consider their 
decision. No difference between the amounts of the three types 
of compensation given was found among subjects forced to make 
an immediate decision. Apparently, time is needed for 
"excessive" and "insufficient" condition subjects to restore 
equity by justifying their not compensating their partners.
Examples of restoration of equity through compensatory 
altruism (e.g., Darlington & Macker, 1966), self-punishment 
(Freedman, et al., 1967), and derogation of the victim 
(e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966) have been presented in sections 
of this review appropriate to the theoretical interpretations 
of their results given by the respective authors themselves.
Experiments by Brock and Buss (1962, 1964) were 
presented by Walster et al. (1970) as examples of restoration 
of equity by minimization of harm done (Brock & Buss, 1962) 
and by denial of responsibility for harming (Brock & Buss,
1964). The harm-doing in these studies was the "administra­
tion of electric shock" to an experimental confederate. The 
authors of these reports described their results as demonstra­
tions of the reduction of "post-aggression dissonance" which 
followed "forced compliance" to perform attitude-discrepant 
behavior (i.e., the subjects had indicated their opposition 
to administering electric shock). That dissonance and equity 
interpretations can be interchanged is not surprising since
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Adams (1965) modeled much of his original equity theory on 
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.
Leventhal, Allen, and KerneIgor (1969) used equity 
theory to explain the behavior of subjects who, themselves, 
had been the victims of injustice, as well as that of sub­
jects responsible for injustice. Subjects and their partners 
(confederates) worked a series of arithmetic problems and 
received a monetary reward for their joint efforts. During 
the test phase of the experiment, the subjects' partner was 
allowed to divide the money for the team, and the subjects 
were then given the option of slightly modifying this division. 
The major dependent variable was the manner in which subjects 
modified their partner's division of the money. In seven 
different conditions, a subject's share of a total of $1.40 
ranged from $1.20 to only 2 cents. Results revealed that, in 
their modifications of their partners' division of the money, 
underrewarded subjects increased their share of the total and 
overrewarded subjects decreased their share significantly more 
than other subjects. In addition, a postexperimental ques­
tionnaire indicated that the level of tension experienced by 
the subjects (as a result of the way the money was divided) 
increased as the magnitude of inequity increased, i.e., as the 
subjects' initial share of the money moved further away from 
an equal division of the winnings.
Perceived injustice. The research of Lerner and Simmons 
(e.g., Lerner, 1970; Lerner, 1971; Lerner & Simmons, 1966;
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Simmons & Lerner, 1968) sought to explain why people can be 
"both cruelly indifferent and compassionately concerned about 
the suffering of others" (Lerner, 1970, p. 207). An alterna­
tive to the equity theory explanation of why subjects might 
derogate rather than compensate someone dependent on them for 
help was sought. The basic assumption of this research was 
that people have a need to believe that they live in a just 
world, a world in which people get what they deserve. Any 
perception of undeserved suffering, i.e., of someone suffer­
ing through no fault of his own, constitutes a "perceived 
injustice" and threatens one's belief in a just world. Rather 
than discard his belief about the nature of the world, the 
observer is motivated to "reestablish justice." He can either 
compensate the victim for his suffering or cognitively distort 
the situation to persuade himself that the victim deserved 
his fate. Derogating the victim, i.e., ascribing to him 
undesirable personality traits, will reestablish justice for 
the observer.
In a study of Lerner and Simmons (1966) subjects observed 
"a study of the effect of strong negative reinforcement on 
pair-associate learning." Subjects watched a "closed circuit 
T.V." (actually videotaped) showing of a female confederate 
"receiving" electric shock for each "incorrect" response made. 
Subjects were then divided into six groups. In two conditions 
in which subjects were given the chance to compensate the 
confederate for her "suffering," they were told that the
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experiment was half over and that they should vote on whether 
the confederate would receive more shock, or receive money 
(positive reinforcement) for "correct" responses, or receive 
neither shock nor money in the second half of the experiment. 
Subjects were then either told ("Known reward") that the 
confederate would get money or were not told ("Uncertain reward 
decision") what decision had been made. In four conditions in 
which compensating the victim was not possible, subjects were 
told that: (1) the experiment was at its mid-point ("Mid­
point") and that the confederate would be shocked in the 
second half; (2) the experiment had ended ("End-point");
(3) they had actually seen a tape of an experiment already 
finished ("Past event"); and (4) the experiment had ended and 
also that the confederate had, against her wishes, decided to 
undergo shock in the experiment so that the subject could 
receive her experimental credit ("Martyr"). All subjects then 
rated the personality of the confederate on a questionnaire.
Both "known-reward" and "uncertain-reward-decision" 
subjects were expected to compensate the confederate by voting 
for positive reinforcement for the second half of the exper­
iment, and almost all these subjects did so. Since compensating 
the confederate should reestablish justice, both groups were 
expected to rate the confederate positively in comparison with 
the other, noncompensating groups. "Known-reward" subjects 
did as expected but "uncertain-reward-decision" subjects 
generally rated the confederate negatively. Apparently subjects
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had to be informed that their vote for compensating the 
confederate had led to actual compensation in order for 
justice to be fully reestablished; otherwise, subjects will 
"reject the victim."
"Past-event"end-point," and "mid-point" subjects 
were all expected to perceive injustice and to reestablish 
justice by devaluing the confederate. These subjects behaved 
as expected with "mid-point" subjects rating the confederate 
the most negatively, since the knowledge of further "shocking" 
of the confederate (as opposed to thinking the experiment was 
over) presumably caused "mid-point" subjects to perceive the 
most injustice in their situation. The behavior of the 
"martyr" subjects was the least predictable. It was expected 
that subjects might rate the confederate positively for being 
a martyr who had "received" shock so that subjects could earn 
experimental credit. The somewhat surprising result was that 
"martyr-condition" subjects rated the confederate as negatively 
as did "mid-point" subjects. "Martyr" subjects apparently 
differed from the others in not viewing the confederate as 
an "innocent victim." They rated the confederate negatively 
because the confederate had foolishly chosen to be shocked 
and, therefore, justly met the fate she deserved. Contrary 
to common sense, the "martyr-condition" confederate's altruistic 
behavior ("suffering" for the subject's sake) did not win her 
a positive rating; instead, it threatened the subject's belief 
in a just world.
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In a follow-up to the above experiment, Lerner (1971) 
further investigated the reaction of subjects to an altruis­
tically motivated "martyr." Subjects again rated negatively 
a confederate who had reluctantly agreed to be "shocked" so 
that subjects could earn credit. However, subjects did not 
devalue a confederate who was only acting like someone being 
shocked or who was monetarily compensated by the experimenter 
for "suffering." There is no injustice in not being shocked 
or in being paid for being shocked. Lerner (1971) also 
investigated the possibility that subjects devalued a non­
compensated "martyr" not to establish justice in an unjust 
situation but because they felt guilty that the confederate 
had "suffered" for their sake. One of the experiments Lerner 
reported, therefore, involved subjects from a sociology class 
not eligible for experimental credit. They were included in 
a group of observers who watched the confederate "receive" 
shock on "closed circuit T.V." Subjects were told that some 
of the observers were psychology students who would earn 
credit as a result of the confederate's "suffering." Sociology- 
subjects still rated the confederate negatively, even though 
they had no reason to feel guilty about the confederate's 
actions.
Simmons and Lerner (1968) studied the effects of a prior 
work experience on the probability that subjects will act to 
correct an unjust situation. The experiment involved subjects 
in a two-phase work experience. In the first phase of a
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Berkowitz-type supervisor-worker situation (e.g., Berkowitz & 
Daniels, 1963) subjects were supervisors who wrote instructions 
to workers on how to construct paper envelopes. Workers (not 
seen by subjects) then supposedly worked to win a money prize 
for their supervisors. The more envelopes the worker made, 
the larger the supervisor's prize. Subjects were either 
rewarded by a good worker performance ("Prior reward") or 
betrayed by a poor worker ("Fail-betrayed"). In the second 
work session, subjects became workers with the chance to help 
a supervisor who had also been either rewarded or betrayed.
Simmons and Lerner (1968) reasoned that subjects who 
themselves had experienced an injustice (i.e., "fail-betrayed" 
subjects) should be more highly motivated to compensate a 
partner for a prior injustice suffered by the partner than 
will subjects who have not personally experienced a prior 
injustice (i.e., "prior reward" subjects). The authors pre­
dicted and results confirmed the predictions that "fail- 
betrayed" subjects would make significantly more envelopes 
for a previously betrayed partner than for a previously 
rewarded partner, while this difference was not as likely to 
occur (and did not) for "prior-reward" subjects. These results 
would seem contradictory to those of Berkowitz and Daniels 
(1964) and others that prior help increased and prior denial 
of help decreased a subject's tendency to help someone else.
It should be noted, however, that Berkowitz and Daniels'
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subjects were not given any information about prior unjust
treatment of the person needing their help.
2
Empathy, or vicarious drive. Aronfreed (1968, 1970) 
pointed out that the common assertion that altruistic behavior 
occurs in the absence of external reward does not necessarily 
imply that the behavior can be maintained without any reinforc­
ing consequences. Specifically, Aronfreed (1968, 1970) 
proposed that the reinforcement for altruistic behavior takes 
the form of empathie experience by the help giver of either 
increases in positive affect or decreases in negative affect 
in the help recipient. "Empathie or vicarious control is the 
criterion of the truly altruistic act" (Aronfreed, 1970, p. 105), 
While helping behavior may originally be controlled by its 
immediate external outcomes, helping behavior comes under a 
child's own internalized control during socialization. This 
internalized control is the result of the conditioned associa­
tion between reinforcing changes of affectivity in the child 
and the cues of affect change in another person, called the 
socializing agent. Simply stated, this conditioning of 
another's affective experiences to those of the child con­
stitutes the development of the child's capacity for empathy. 
After the capacity for empathy develops, the child can then 
learn altruistic acts the sufficient reinforcement for which
2
Both "sympathy" and "empathy" have been frequently 
proposed, and often used interchangeably, as mediating 
processes to explain altruistic behavior; for a clarification 
of their meanings and historical review of the concepts see 
Wispe", 1967.
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is the child's empathie affective experience of immediate 
consequences of such acts for the recipient of his help.
Later in the socialization process, the child's ability for 
cognitive representation of the future consequences of present 
behavior will develop. His altruistic behavior can then be 
maintained solely by the anticipation of its consequences for a 
help recipient, even when the recipient is not physically 
present.
According to Aronfreed (1970), the establishment of the 
instrumental value of overt altruistic acts occurs within two 
different learning paradigms: (1) The "behavior-contingent
learning paradigm" involves the empathically-mediated rein­
forcement of the child's helping behavior. (2) In the 
"observational learning paradigm" the child observes the 
helping behavior of a model, or socializing agent. Assuming 
the child's capacity for empathie affective experience and 
for cognitive representations of the consequences of behavior 
has already developed, the child associates certain changes 
in his own affect with his cognitive representation of the 
affective consequences for the help-giving model or social­
izing agent. These conditioned affective responses then 
generalize to the child's own helping behavior.
Two experiments by Aronfreed and Paskal (reported by 
Aronfreed, 1968, 1970) demonstrated both behavior-contingent 
and observational learning of altruistic behavior. In the 
behavior-contingent learning experiment, girls from six to
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eight years old were shown how to work a "choice box" by a 
female confederate. The first phase of this two-phase exper­
iment involved the attachment of the child's empathically 
experienced positive affect to expressive cues of positive 
affect in the confederate. The confederate demonstrated that 
operating one of two levers on the choice box delivered some 
candy 60 percent of the time, and that 60 percent of the time 
the other lever was pressed a red light on the box came on.
In the experimental condition, the basic socialization paradigm, 
the onset of the red light caused the confederate to emit 
expressive affective cues (i.e., a smile and the excited 
exclamation "There's the light'.") and then to give the child 
physical affection (i.e., a firm hug). In one control condi­
tion the confederate emitted expressive cues but not physical 
affection, and in the other control condition the child received 
physical affection but there were no expressive cues.
In the experiment's second phase, the instrumental value 
for the child of "correct" lever pressing in producing the 
agent's expressive cues was established. The child now oper­
ated the levers herself. The confederate emitted the same 
expressive cues as in the first experimental phase whenever 
the child sacrificed her chance for candy and chose the lever 
which illuminated the red light; the confederate gave no 
physical affection in this second phase.
The dependent variable was the number of trials on which 
each child behaved altruistically, i.e., sacrificed candy in
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order to press the lever which made the confederate happy 
(as evidenced by the confederate's expressive cues). Results 
revealed that only experimental subjects, who had experienced 
the pairing of expressive cues and physical affection during 
the training phase, chose the lever which produced expressive 
cues more frequently than they chose the candy-producing lever 
in the testing phase. The authors concluded that only in the 
experimental condition had the reinforcing affective value 
for the child of the confederate's expressive cues been estab­
lished. Only in this condition did the confederate's expres­
sive cues come to elicit positive affect in the child through 
their association with physical affection, which presumably 
already had positive affective value for the child.
It should be noted that Aronfreed's behavior-contingent 
learning paradigm for the "socialization of altruistic 
behavior" conforms closely to the traditional conditioning 
paradigm for the acquisition and subsequent testing of a 
secondary reinforcer (e.g., Miller, 1951). The traditional 
paradigm consists of two phases: (1) the training phase
involves the pairing of a neutral stimulus (e.g., expressive 
cues) with a primary reinforcer (e.g., positive affect from 
physical affection); (2) the testing phase involves a deter­
mination of the secondary reinforcing effects of the pre­
viously neutral stimulus (e.g., positive affect elicited by 
the expressive cues), by presenting that stimulus contingent 
on the occurrence of a to-be-learned instrumental response 
(e.g., lever pressing). The behavior-contingent paradigm
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also closely resembles Berger's (1962) vicarious-drive account 
of altruistic behavior. In Berger's terms, positive or nega­
tive emotion in a "performer" leads to "vicarious instigation" 
of a corresponding emotion in an "observer." "Vicarious 
reinforcement" of an observer's helping behavior would, there­
fore, follow acts which either aroused positive emotion or 
reduced negative emotion in the performer, in the form of 
corresponding changes in the observer's emotions.
Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) ran an experiment similar to 
the above experiment of Aronfreed and Paskal. Using essen­
tially the same lever-pressing procedure, they found essen­
tially the same results. Midlarsky and Bryan's experiment 
also included an additional test of altruism. At the end of 
the lever-pressing portion of their experiment, the authors 
equated the children in the experimental and control groups 
for the number of candies which they possessed. The children 
were then given the opportunity to make an anonymous donation 
of candy to a fictitious needy child. As in the lever-pressing 
session, the authors again found the children to whom both 
expressive cues and physical affection had been presented to 
be the most altruistic. Midlarsky and Bryan concluded that, 
for experimental subjects, a "norm of self-sacrifice" internal­
ized during the lever-pressing session had carried over to 
the "charity" session. Aronfreed (1968) concluded that the 
altruistic behavior of subjects in the Midlarsky and Bryan 
experiment was "under the internalized control of their cognitive
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representations of the consequences of their actions for 
others /_p. 149.7." Subjects could only cognitively anticipate 
the "needy child's" reactions to the receipt of candy, since 
the "needy child" was not present.
Aronfreed and Paskal's (Aronfreed, 1968, 1970) demon­
stration of the observational learning of altruistic behavior 
involved seven- and eight-year-old girls, an adult female 
confederate, and a second female confederate approximately 
the same age as the subjects. For the experimental (basic 
socialization) condition, the three phases of this experiment 
respectively involved: (1) conditioning of distress in the
subject to the observed "distress" of the adult confederate;
(2) observation by the subject of the altruistic behavior of 
the adult confederate which relieved the subject's distress; 
and (3) giving the subject the opportunity to demonstrate 
his observational learning of the altruistic act by relieving 
the "distress" of a child confederate, the reinforcement for 
such action presumably being the reduction of empathically- 
induced distress in the subject. In the first phase, both 
the subject and the adult confederate wore earphones during 
the course of a "toy-classification task." At the end of 
six of the 12 task trials the subject witnessed the confederate 
react in distress to the apparent receipt of an aversive loud 
noise in her earphones. The subject then heard a loud noise 
in her own earphones. In the second phase of the experiment, 
the subject observed the adult confederate press a lever which
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turned off the earphone-noise whenever it occurred. In the 
third phase (the test phase) the subject did not wear ear­
phones but a child confederate did. On half of the trials 
in this final phase the subject saw the child confederate 
react in distress to apparent earphone-noise. The dependent 
measure of altruism was the number of trials on which the 
subject pressed the lever which reduced the child confederate's 
"distress." In four control conditions: (1) the adult con­
federate's "distress" was not paired with the subject's 
distress during the initial phase of the experiment; (2) the 
subject's earphone-noise was very mild; (3) the adult confed­
erate wore earphones but did not emit distress cues; and
(4) the adult confederate did not even wear earphones. Results 
revealed that only the experimental group showed significant 
altruistic behavior.
Proposal
The present experiment will consider an experimental 
situation previously investigated by Weiss, Buchanan, Altstatt, 
and Lombardo (1971) and Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, and Stich (1973). 
Those authors found evidence that the roots of altruistic 
behavior are so deep that people will not only help others 
while receiving no externally administered reward for doing 
so, but find the mere act of helping rewarding. Subjects in 
these studies learned an instrumental response the only 
apparent reinforcement for which was to deliver an experimental 
confederate from "electric-shock-induced suffering." In
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addition, these experiments revealed some profound similar­
ities between the reinforcing function of the opportunity 
to help another person and the action of more traditional 
reinforcers: not only can learning be based on what was
called "altruistic reinforcement," but a number of standard 
reinforcement variables showed the same pattern of effects 
with an altruistic reinforcer as they do with conventional 
non-altruistic reinforcers. Analogs of delay of reinforce­
ment, partial reinforcement, magnitude of reinforcement, and 
intermittent shock effects were found.
In order to confidently label as "altruistic" the 
reinforcement which produced instrumental response learning 
(as evidenced by a significant increase in instrumental 
response speed over conditioning trials) by subjects in 
Weiss et al. (1971, 1973), the absence of any possible external 
non-altruistic reward must be conclusively shown. A possible 
source of external non-altruistic reinforcement is suggested 
by the literature on altruism in animals (e.g., Lavery & Foley, 
1963; Rice, 1964) and on vicarious emotional arousal in humans 
(e.g., Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966; Berger, 1962; DiLollo & 
Berger, 1965). These studies provided evidence that, at least 
in some instances, the sights and sounds of a suffering animal 
or person constitute direct aversive stimulation to another 
animal of the same species or to another person, and that this 
stimulation leads to emotional arousal and increased activity 
in the "observer." If the "suffering" of the experimental
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confederate constitutes direct aversive stimulation and pro­
duces emotional arousal or drive induction for observing 
subjects in the Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) experimental situa­
tion, then the removal of the "suffering" from the subjects' 
presence by any means should produce some reduction of emotion 
or drive and be at least somewhat reinforcing for subjects.
If the aversive "suffering" of the confederate can be removed 
from the subjects' presence by some non-altruistic means, by 
some method which does not involve helping to relieve the 
confederate's "suffering," subjects might learn an instrumental 
response for this entirely non-altruistic reinforcement. If 
subjects will learn an instrumental response which does not 
involve helping the confederate, it is conceivable, then, 
that the reinforcement for subjects who learn a response which 
helps the confederate is also non-altruistic, or at least 
partially non-altruistic in nature.
The present experiment will contain three groups of 
subjects: (1) a Helping group for which a subject's instru­
mental response will "turn off" shock to the experimental 
confederate and cause the confederate to relax for ten seconds 
at the end of each of the 12 conditioning trials; (2) a 
No-Reinforcement Control group for which an instrumental 
response will do nothing but mark the end of each trial, the 
confederate continuing to "receive" shock and to "suffer"; and
(3) a Leavine-the-Scene group for which a subject's response 
does not "turn off" the confederate's shock, but does cause a
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masonite shutter to be lowered between the subject and the 
confederate at the end of each trial removing the confederate 
and his "suffering” from "the scene" for ten seconds.
In the present experiment the instrumental response 
will be pushing a button, and the dependent variable will be 
instrumental response speed (1/latency). The helping and 
no-reinforcement control groups are similar to conditions used 
in Weiss et al. (1971, 1973) and their performance is, 
therefore, relatively predictable, but it is not certain how 
subjects in the novel leaving-the-scene group will behave. 
Nevertheless, two specific hypotheses are ventured;
(1) Response speeds for both helping and leaving-the-scene 
groups will significantly increase over trials (with the 
response-contingent events in both groups proving to be 
reinforcing), while those for no-reinforcement controls will 
not increase; (2) Asymptotic response speeds will have a 
specified rank order, i.e., asymptotic speed for the helping 
group will be faster than that of the leaving-the-scene group, 
and the control group will have the slowest speed (i.e., the 
tentative assumption is that helping will be more reinforcing 
than leaving the scene).
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Subjects
A sample of 75 undergraduate volunteer subjects will 
be selected from the Psych-1 subject pool at the University 
of Oklahoma. The subjects will be randomly assigned to three 
groups with the provision that they be completely counter­
balanced so that: there will be 25 subjects per group, subject
and experimental confederate will always be the same sex, and 
that each of the seven confederates to be used will run the 
same number of subjects in each group.
Deception, masking task, and confederates
A deception will be used to mask the learning task so 
that the conditioning process will not be overridden by the 
subjects' normal use of their higher mental processes (Spence, 
1966). The experiment will be represented as a study of per­
formance of a complex motor task under stress, and of evaluation 
of that performance by a naive, disinterested observer. It 
will be explained that in aviation psychology such knowledge 
is "becoming more and more important these days, as such 
things as flying or directing aircraft get more and more 
specialized and complex."
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A confederate of the experimenter will sit beneath a 
bright floodlamp inside a wooden booth and ostensibly receive 
continuous, "painful but harmless" electric shock while trying 
to track a target on a screen. Each subject's job will, be to 
observe the confederate through an observation window set in 
one of the four walls of the tracking booth and to evaluate 
his performance. The apparatus will provide necessary para­
phernalia for the confederate's tracking task and for the 
"recording" of the subject's evaluations.
The reinforcement for subjects within one of the two 
experimental groups, the helping group, will be the offset of 
shock to the confederate, signalled by a noticeable relaxing 
of the confederate and by the offset of the floodlamp. This 
reinforcement will occur at the end of each of the 12 condi­
tioning trials which will be referred to as a brief, pre­
programmed "between-cycles" rest period for the confederate. 
What is expected to serve as reinforcement for the second 
experimental group, the leaving-the-scene group, will be the 
hiding of the "suffering" confederate behind a masonite shutter 
which will be lowered over the observation window set in the 
confederate's booth during each inter-trial period. This 
event will be presented as a "between-cycles" interval in 
which subjects are deliberately removed from the evaluation 
situation for a time so that they can then enter each new 
"cycle" (when the shutter is raised and the "distressed" 
confederate reappears) as if it is an entirely different
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situation in which spontaneous judgments of the confederate's 
performance can be made and will hopefully be uncontaminated 
by information about previous "cycles." This supposed interest 
in spontaneous evaluations of performance on each new "cycle" 
will also be expressed to the other two groups in order to 
achieve the necessary experimental symmetry (of course, the 
masonite shutter will never be mentioned to the other groups 
since they will never encounter it). The term "cycle" will 
always be substituted for "trial" so as not to suggest a 
learning experiment.
Five undergraduates and two graduate students, all 
appearing to be approximately the same age, will serve as 
confederates. The role of confederate will be explicitly 
defined, discussed, and practiced by the seven confederates.
The role will include agonized expressions and shaking in 
reaction to the "receipt" of shock and, for the benefit of 
subjects in the helping group, a noticeable relaxation and a 
sigh of relief when the shock "goes off." In addition to the 
dramatics presented to convince subjects that the confederate 
is being shocked, a particularly effective sign of physical 
stress, actual facial sweating by the confederate produced by 
the heat of the overhead floodlamp, should serve to enhance 
the general plausibility of the. deception and masking task.
In order to prevent fear of electric shock in the 
subjects developing within an individual session or spreading 
through the Psych-1 subject pool, it will be made clear that
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Psych-1 students are never shocked and that the confederates 
are undergraduate volunteers from more advanced classes who 
have reached 21 years of age, the minimum age required to 
sign a release form for the shock phase of the experiment. 
Apparatus
The room in which the subject and confederate will sit 
shares a common wall with the experimenter's control room.
On one side of this wall the confederate will sit on a 
cushioned seat inside a wooden booth, which measures 3 X 3 X 
6 feet in its external dimensions, and perform his bogus 
tracking task while reacting to the "shock" and bright flood­
lamp. At the same time, the subject will sit on a chair 
beside the booth, at the same height as the confederate, and 
observe the confederate in profile view, through an 18 inch 
wide by 12 inch high clear glass window set in one of the 
walls of the booth. Meanwhile, the experimenter will sit in 
the adjacent control room before a master control panel, 
setting controls appropriate for each experimental condition, 
recording instrumental response latency readouts, and communi­
cating with confederate or subject in the next room by means 
of a microphone connected to headphones worn by both the 
confederate and subject during the experiment.
Placed in the wall of the confederate's-booth facing 
the subject will be an "alarm button," the glass observation 
window, six signal lights, three "evaluation dials," and a 
"record button." Upon illumination the signal lights will
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read: (1) "SHOCK ON;" (2) "SHOCK OFF;" (3) "EVALUATION 1;"
(4) "EVALUATION 2;" (5) "EVALUATION 3;" and (6) "REPORT."
Lying atop the wooden booth will be the subject's headphones.
Placed within one of the internal walls of the confed­
erate's booth will be a fake radar-like tracking screen, two 
knobs (called "tracking-task controls"), an electric wall 
outlet (into which the confederate's "forearm electrode" is 
plugged), an "alarm button," and the floodlamp. Behind the 
tracking screen will be a number of randomly-placed Christmas 
tree lights which, when the confederate manipulates his 
control knobs, will conspicuously flash on and off to enhance 
the credibility of the masking task. The floodlamp will be 
positioned about 12 inches above and in front of the confederate.
During the experiment the confederate will wear an 
"electrode" strapped to his left forearm, and headphones.
Temporarily secured above the observation window, on 
the confederate's side of the wall of the booth which will 
face the subject, will be a masonite shutter large enough 
(19 inches by 14 inches) to cover the observation window when 
lowered and positioned between the window and the confederate.
The shutter will be raised and lowered, exclusively for sub­
jects in the leaving-the-scene condition, by tugging at or 
releasing a nylon cord which will run through a series of 
pullies up through the ceiling of the booth, through the wall 
separating the experimental and control rooms, down to a hook 
set in the experimenter's control panel.
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An electric digital stop-clock (1/100 second) on the 
experimenter's control panel will measure the subject's 
response latency--the time between the onset of a "REPORT" 
signal (the conditioned stimulus signalling the subject to 
make his instrumental response) and the instrumental response. 
Procedure
Pre-experimental procedure and instructions. When a 
subject arrives either on schedule or late he will find 
"another subject" (the confederate) already seated in a waiting 
room outside the experimental room. When a subject comes early, 
the confederate will exit through a convenient back door to the 
lab and then enter the waiting room through the same front used 
by the subject. The experimenter will soon greet the two and 
lead them into the experimental room. After introducing the 
subject as a Psych-1 student and the confederate as an over- 
21-years-old advanced student, the experimenter will explain 
"the purpose of the experiment" and the different jobs the 
two will perform. The role of the masonite shutter will be 
explained to subjects in the leaving-the-scene group. Next, 
the confederate will complete a bogus medical checklist and 
sign a release form agreeing to be shocked. The "electrode" 
will then be placed on the confederate's left forearm and the 
confederate will be seated in the tracking booth. As the 
experimenter leaves for the control room he will mention that 
the "alarm button" on the wall in front of each person is to 
be pressed only if some serious emergency arises; he will also
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have each person put on headphones so that he will be able to 
speak to them from the control room.
Cycle of operation. Each of the 12 trials of the exper­
iment will follow a cycle of shock, floodlamp, and the signal 
light "SHOCK ON" either coming on or continuing from the 
previous trial; illumination of three signals ("EVALUATION 1," 
"EVALUATION 2," "EVALUATION 3") for the subject to set his 
three "evaluation dials" to evaluate the confederate's perform­
ance according to three different criteria; illumination of 
the "REPORT" CS signal for the subject to push his "record 
button" to record his evaluations on tape; the instrumental 
button-pushing response; and the response-contingent event 
appropriate for each condition. In the helping condition, 
each trial-ending button-pushing response will cause the flood­
lamp to go out, the signal light "SHOCK OFF" to come on and 
"SHOCK ON" to go off, the experimenter to announce into the 
subject's headphones "Shock off," and the confederate to relax 
for the ten seconds between trials. For the leaving-the-scene 
group, a trial will end with the experimenter saying, "Shock 
continues" and lowering the masonite shutter to hide the confed­
erate for ten seconds, while the "SHOCK ON" light remains on.
In the no-reinforcement control condition, a trial will end 
with "the shock" continuing, the confederate continuing to 
"perform under stress," and the floodlamp and "SHOCK ON" light 
remaining on.
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Post-expérimentaI procedure. At the conclusion of the 
experiment the subject will witness the confederate assuring 
the experimenter that he has not been adversely affected by 
the stress. The subject will then be dismissed while the 
confederate will be asked to remain to "complete a questionnaire," 
so that the confederate could avoid any potentially embarrassing 
post-experimental contact with the subject.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL CONDITIONS
The two of you are participating in what amounts to 
two separate experiments— one on performance testing, and 
the other on evaluation of performance.
I'll refer to you as "Subject A;" you're from one of 
the advanced psychology classes, and when you volunteered 
to be in this research, you knew that the experiment would 
involve performance under stress, right? You'll be working 
at a tracking task in the booth, and the stress will consist 
of a harmless electric shock.
I'll refer to you as "Subject B;" let me emphasize 
that you're not going to be involved with any shocks or 
stress of any sort. What you'll be doing is watching A 
through this window, and making evaluations of his/her 
performance.
This tracking task is, of course, similar to what 
pilots, navigators, airport traffic controllers and the like 
have to do, and obviously they often have to work under stress 
most of the time. The evaluation experiment is designed to 
learn how well such performance can be judged by observers 
who have no experience with the task itself. This is some­
thing that is becoming more and more important these days, 
as such things as flying or directing aircraft get more and 
more specialized and complex.
Now, as I said, the shock and the general stress 
situation are quite harmless, but I do have to go through a 
medical checklist with you, and have you sign a release.
GO THROUGH CHECKLIST-RELEASE ON NEXT PAGE
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LIABILITY WAIVER 
INSTITUTE OF GROUP RELATIONS 
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
HAVE YOU EVER HAD:
Abnormal heart condition 
Heart attack 
High blood pressure 
Chronic Respiratory 
condition 
Diabetes 
Epilepsy
Convulsive seizures 
Fainting spells 
Severe electric shock 
Been severely burned 
Been in deep shock 
following injury 
Psychiatric treatment
HAVE YOU EVER:
Worked under stressful 
conditions 
Worked as an elec­
trician
To the best of your knowledge, do you suffer from any physical, 
emotional or mental problem which would make your participation 
in this study hazardous or injurious to you?
I am 21 years old and willingly agree to participate in this 
non-harmful, ELECTRICAL SHOCK experiment.
Subject's Signature
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MORE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL CONDITIONS
The experiment will consist of a series of cycles. 
These lights will show you what's happening and what to do. 
The lights up at the top will show you when the task and 
the stress come on.
After a short time, you'll see the "EVALUATION 1"
signal to make the first evaluation. The first evaluation
is, as you see, how well is the subject coping with the 
stress (or task), and to make it you set the top knob.
When the "EVALUATION 2" signal comes on, you set 
the middle knob to show whether you think the stress is too 
high or low (task too hard or easy) for him to either per­
form effectively, or to really test his ability.
When the "EVALUATION 3" signal comes on, set the
bottom knob to show whether you think you would do better
or worse than the subject if you were performing the task.
The last signal is "REPORT." We record these 
evaluations on data tape, and to do it, you push this button 
(DEMONSTRATE).
That will complete the cycle; there may be a brief 
rest period, or he may just go on with the task. In a short 
while, you'll again get the series of evaluation signals, 
then the "REPORT" signal, and so on.
We'll go on running until we've collected 15 minutes 
of actual data, so we can't say how many cycles, or how much 
overall time is involved. When we have the 15 minutes, 
we'll just shut down, even if it's in the middle of a cycle.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
LEAVING-THE-SCENE CONDITION
The experiment consists of a number of cycles in which 
you will make evaluations of Sa's "performance under stress." 
During each cycle, we are primarily interested in people's 
ability to make quick, spontaneous judgments concerning the 
quality of another's performance. We would, therefore, like 
you to consider each cycle as a separate, independent evalua­
tion situation, in which you will judge Sa's performance at 
the moment, during the particular cycle, rather than evaluat­
ing him on the basis of any improvement or deterioration in 
his performance as compared with that shown in previous cycles 
of the experiment. In order to emphasize the fact that we 
want spontaneous evaluations of performance at a given time 
during a given cycle, rather than relative judgments of per­
formance from one cycle to the next, a masonite shutter will 
be lowered at the end of each cycle, and will cover the 
window through which you will be observing Sa, until the 
start of the next cycle. At the start of each new cycle, 
the masonite door will be lifted and you will resume your 
observation and evaluation of Sa's performance. During the 
between-cycles period. Sa will continue to work at his 
stressful task behind the masonite shutter. This brief period
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serves simply to remind you that you have been removed from 
one evaluation situation in which one set of spontaneous 
evaluations was required and that you are about to enter a 
new evaluation situation in which a new set of spontaneous 
judgments will be required.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BOTH THE HELPING CONDITION 
AND THE NO-REINFORCEMENT CONIROL CONDITION
The experiment consists of a number of cycles in which 
you will make evaluations of Sa's "performance under stress." 
During each cycle, we are primarily interested in people's 
ability to make quick, spontaneous judgments concerning the 
quality of another's performance. We would, therefore, like 
you to consider each cycle as a separate, independent evalua­
tion situation, in which you will judge Sa's performance at 
the moment, during that particular cycle, rather than evaluat­
ing him on the basis of any improvement or deterioration in 
his performance as compared with that shown in previous cycles 
of the experiment. As each cycle ends, you will leave one 
evaluation situation in which one set of spontaneous evalua­
tions was required and will then, at the start of each new 
cycle, enter a new evaluation situation in which a new set of 
spontaneous judgments will be required.
FOR ALL CONDITIONS
(After preliminary instructions to S & confederate & 
after seating confederate in booth, give one practice trial).
SET-UP FOR PRACTICE TRIAL
(1) PT DRUM TO INDEX "50"
(2) EO ON
(3) E7 ON
(4) E9 ON
(5) For leaving-the-scene condition--OPERATE MASONITE 
SHUTTER
(6) ALL OTHER SWITCHES OFF
NOTE TO EXPERIMENTER
(During PRACTICE TRIAL —  Explain to Sb that the lights flashing 
on & off in the booth indicate how well Sa is performing 
his task. The more they flash, the worse he is doing).
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FINAL INSTRUCTIONS
(Say to both Sa & Sb —  Now during the running of the 
experiment, if anything should go wrong, you 
can press your alarm button up on the wall-- 
but only use it if there's really something 
critical.
Also, if 1 have to talk to either of you 
during the experiment. I'll use the intercom, 
since the ventilating fan makes so much noise. 
So, would you both please put on your head­
phones .
NOW CLOSE DOOR TO BOOTH & BEGIN EXPERIMENT.
DURING TRIAL 1, NOTE EACH STEP OF THE PROCEDURE TO Sb OVER 
THE INTERCOM.
APPENDIX C
MEAN RESPONSE SPEEDS FOR CONDITIONING TRIALS
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MEAN RESPONSE SPEEDS FOR CONDITIONING TRIALS
Trial Helping Leaving-the-Scene No-Reinforce­ment Control
1 .580 .634 .638
2 .670 .738 .740
3 .838 .989 .750
4 .988 .880 .809
5 1.070 .862 .775
6 .953 .851 .853
7 .896 .890 .815
8 1.013 .872 .817
9 1.007 .818 .774
10 1.163 .841 .814
11 1.101 .857 .773
12 1.200 .872 .865
N = 25/Group
APPENDIX D 
STATISTICAL TESTS
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Repeated Measures A n a ly s is  o f V arian ce
of H e lp in g  Group Response Speeds
Across A l l  C o n d itio n in g  T r ia ls
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 31.598 24
Within Subjects 37.318 275
Trials 9.602 11 .873 8.314*
Residual 27.716 264 .105
Total 68.916 299
* £  <  .001
N = 25
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Repeated Measures A n a lys is  o f V a rian c e  o f
L e a v in g -th e -S cen e  Group Response Speeds
Across A l l  C o n d itio n in g  T r ia ls
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 17.962 24
Within Subjects 28.970 275
Trials 2.039 11 .185 1.814*
Residual 26.931 264 .102
Total 46.932 299
* £  < .  05
N = 25
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Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance of 
No-Reinforcement Control Group Response
Speeds Across All Conditioning Trials
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 23.439 24
Within Subjects 22.451 275
Trials 1.016 11 092 1.136
Residual 21.435 264 081
Total 45.890 299
N = 25
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Repeated Measures A n a lys is  o f V arian ce  o f
Leav in g -th e -S cen e  Group Response Speeds
Across C o n d itio n in g  T r ia ls  1 -4
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 7.679 24
Within Subjects 16.337 75
Trials 1.814 3 . 605 2.995*
Residual 14.523 72 .202
Total 24.016 99
* 2  < . 0 5
N = 25
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Repeated Measures A n a lys is  o f V arian ce  o f
L e a v in g -th e -S ce n e  Group Response Speeds
Across C o n d itio n in g  T r ia ls  4 -1 2
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 13.603 24
Within Subjects 12.097 200
Trials .092 8 .012 <  1
Residual 12.005 192 .063
Total 25.700 224
N = 25
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Sex X Groups Analysis of Variance 
on Block of Trials 9-12
Source SS df MS F
A (Sex) .236 1 .236 1.542
B (Group) 1.435 2 .718 4.693*
A X B .003 2 .002 <  1
Within Cell 10.541 69 .153
Total 12.215 74
*£ ^  .05
N = 14 females & 11 males/Group

